Scalability and Fungibility: two sides of the same Bitcoin ...
Bitcoin Besitz und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Fungibilität ...
Mimblewimble is the name of a [whitepaper](https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizardry/mimblewimble.txt) published in 2016 by pseudonymous contributor. The paper proposes a radical restructuring of the Bitcoin protocol in order to massively improve privacy and scalability of the digital currency. It is named after the Tongue-Tying Curse in Harry Potter because it aims to prevent users from saying too much about their transactions.
Masari (MSR) is a scalability-focused, untraceable, secure, and fungible cryptocurrency using the RingCT protocol. Masari is the first CryptoNote coin to develop uncle mining and a fully client side web wallet.
Fungibility of Bitcoin, and effects on long vs. short term capital gains tax
I have been storing away some Bitcoin in a hardware wallet for 2 years, hoping to be able to sell at the right moment and only have to pay long term capital gains tax. Unfortunately, I had forgotten about this when I bought more Bitcoin a few weeks ago, which would obviously make them subject to short term capital gains tax. Currently the Bitcoins are in separate wallets. If I keep them separate, can I still consider the coins on the hardware wallet as long term gains if I sell them in the next couple of months? Thanks for any input!
Fungibility of Bitcoin that is linked to OFAC Sanctions List
I've been thinking a lot about the Treasury's OFAC Designation of the two bitcoin accounts. What this means is that anyone transacting to/from those two addresses (1AjZPMsnmpdK2Rv9KQNfMurTXinscVro9V and 149w62rY42aZBox8fGcmqNsXUzSStKeq8C) is subject to penalties. This raises a lot of questions - Does this affect only transactions directly dealing with those addresses, or every single downstream transaction? If the latter, is it even possible for merchants, exchanges, etc to ascertain that a certain address is linked to those sanctioned addresses via transactions going back years? Who is responsible for tracing the coins back?
Does a service like memo.cash impact the fungibility of Bitcoin Cash?
I'm a little unclear on where the data of a memo.cash post is actually stored. I think it's in an optional text field associated with a transaction, but maybe it's not. In any case, does a post on memo.cash become forever connected to some amount of satoshis so that it will show up in the transaction history of BCH I might receive? What I'm really trying to learn about is how data can be stored on the BCH blockchain without negatively impacting fungibility. Is it possible to use BCH as a way of storing additional information about transactions but without that information necessarily being connected to coins used in different contexts later? I hope my question is clear, please let me know if it isn't.
PSA: The biggest threat to Bitcoin at the moment is BitPay
A few weeks ago BitPay made a change to their payment window, which has far reaching implications. They do not show a Bitcoin address anymore at all, you only get a link like this: "bitcoin:?r=https://bitpay.com/i/*****************". This is called BIP70 standard. How this works from a technological side, is that your wallet no longer sends the transaction directly to the Bitcoin network, but to BitPay, and then BitPay decides whether to publish the transaction to the network, or reject it (please feel free to correct me if I am wrong and/or is I have oversimplified things). By doing this, BitPay literally becomes the gatekeeper deciding which transactions are "correct", based on political whims. This already means that BitPay invoices can be paid only with several wallets, as most wallets do not support BIP70 at the moment. While there is nothing wrong with BIP70 per se, what is wrong is that BitPay has made this mandatory. While I do not have any solid proof that BitPay is using this to blacklist addresses / transactions at the moment, it is inevitable that sooner or later they will be forced to not only blacklist some addresses, but more likely to only accept payments from whitelisted addresses. The argument is very simple - up until now, there was no technological way to "reject" a Bitcoin transaction. Now, BitPay has implemented a method to do exactly that. Since the method already exists, the governments will no longer accept the excuse that it is impossible, and will force BitPay (and other Bitcoin payment processors) to implement blacklisting / whitelisting. The worst case scenario would be allowing to only accept payments made using centralized wallets with mandatory KYC. This greatly hurts the fungibility of Bitcoin. The reality is, that most merchants accept bitcoins via BitPay and other Bitcoin payment processors. If I can not use my bitcoins to pay the majority of the merchants, then they are worth less than "untainted" bitcoins. What we, as a community, can do to fight this?
Develop and promote privacy / fungibility improvements for Bitcoin. In my opinion, weak fungibility is currently Bitcoin's biggest problem / risk.
Boycott BitPay and any other Bitcoin payment processors implementing mandatory BIP70.
Promote other, socially responsible, pro-Bitcoin payment processors. Contact the stores which use BitPay, and ask them to switch to another payment processor. Explain your reason why you will no longer purchase from them until they switch their processor.
Is one Bitcoin unique? Or just a unit on an address?
I know transactions can be traced on the blockchain. I've read a few things on the internet about fungibility of Bitcoin on the internet, and so-called tainted coins. But can each coin be individually traced? For example, let's say I have a public address with 10 bitcoin. I receive 1 bitcoin. I then spend 1 bitcoin. Is it possible to know if the bitcoin received was the one spent right after? Or did the coin simply add up to the sum of coins on the public address? If each coin can be individually traced, how does that work, since a coin can have fractions? Does it mean each particular SAT can be traced?
10-12 08:55 - 'No. Fungibility cannot be achieved on a transparent blockchain, no matter what wallet you use or what kind of mixing service you employ. / If you want fungibility, use Monero.' by /u/ProbPatrickWarburton removed from /r/Bitcoin within 637-647min
PSA: Alex Waters is one of the big three pushing for Bitcoin address "greenlisting/whitelisting"
Original post. To: alex_waters , I urge you to reconsider this tactic. I'm sure your intentions are to benefit the digital currency ecosystem by fostering mainstream adoption, but sabotaging the fungibility of Bitcoin is in no way beneficial - the effects are only negative. To the rest of the /bitcoin community: please boycott any business/industry he's involved with. Greenlisting/whitelisting is bad, bad news for Bitcoin. edit: alex_waters requested that I post this link explaining (defending?) his position. I'm not sure it helps his case at all, but in the interest of fairness have linked it.
What a landmark legal case from mid-1700s Scotland tells us about the fungibility and the very nature of money-- and why we should care in light of the recent CoinValidation controversy.
Although the case in question (Crawfurd v. The Royal Bank) happened in the mid-1700s, I think it is highly relevant and bears nicely on the recent controversy surrounding Coinvalidation. This post will also be of interest to anyone fascinated by the history and/or theory of money. While this particular case involved paper banknotes (which arguably are irredeemably flawed) rather than a 'hard currency', it still illustrates nicely the rationale behind a decision which impacted a widely used currency at the time. Of primary consideration in this case was how its resolution would affect the usability of the currency (i.e. a facet from which currency largely derives its value). As we're probably all aware of by now, CoinValidation's plan, if successfully implemented, would presumably lead to the blacklisting of some coins based on their past transfer history (e.g. having at some point been sent to/from deep web contraband marketplaces, having been paid as ransom to malware operators like those of CryptoLocker, having been stolen, having been allegedly 'laundered', having been associated with scams/ponzis, &c). In effect, this would destroy the fungibility of bitcoins. Some 'clean' coins would be easier to spend and transact with, while other 'less clean' or downright 'tainted' coins would be more difficult to use. Thus we would be left with a difficult-to-navigate and frustrating-to-use system whereby some coins are worth more than others (due to their varying spendability). And this largely defeats the purpose of a currency as a facile medium of exchange in the first place. The case Hew Crawfurd brought against the Royal Bank of Scotland in 1749 had the potential for similar ramifications. In 1748, Crawfurd sent two large-denomination banknotes, which he had made marks upon and recorded the serial numbers of, through the mail to an associate. Unfortunately the banknotes were not delivered. After enquiring as to their possible whereabouts with the banks, as well as posting newspaper advertisements, one of the notes eventually turned up rather mysteriously at the Royal Bank, although it wasn't clear whose hands it had passed through to get there. Based on Crawfurd's diligent recording and marking of the bills in question, however, there was no question that it was one of the two that were sent. Crawfurd was duly notified of the note's reappearance. While Crawfurd was eager to be reimbursed for his loss, his claim put the banks in an unenviable position. After all, they presumably had no knowledge that the banknote now in their possession was ill-begotten. Would it be fair to them to eat the loss? And more importantly, what sort of precedent might this set? Kenneth Reid writes:
"The Banks’ concern is easily understood. If holders of banknotes were vulnerable to infirmities of title of which they knew nothing, then this would indeed be ‘a barr to the circulation’ of notes and hence a threat to the whole idea of paper money. And even if that position could be resisted—even if bona fide holders took an unblemished title—there was the further difficulty of assessing the holder’s state of knowledge. Crawfurd had marked the banknotes and advertised his loss. Must a holder be taken to know this and to realize its significance? ‘If’, the Banks reasoned, ‘the writing upon notes and advertising the numbers in the Publick Prints should be found sufficient to interpel people from receiving such notes in payment it would be a mean of putting an intire stop to the circulation of notes and of opening a door for frauds by malicious and designing persons’" (emphasis mine)
After hearing arguments from both sides of the dispute, judges ultimately decided in favor of the bank. The stated rationale for their decision largely rested on a distinction they made between money and real property, and how the terms of ownership should be established:
"The Judges, he wrote, were unanimous ‘that money is not subject to any vitium reale1; and that it cannot be vindicated from the bona fide possessor, however clear the proof [of] the theft may be’. Accordingly, ‘Mr Crawfurd had no claim to the note in question’. Thus was established the rule of bona fide acquisition of money in Scotland. The decision also relieved the Banks of the concern, raised once more during the litigation, that newspaper advertisement might ‘amount to a sufficient Interpellation to all the World’ as to deprive the recipient of good faith." 1'aninherenttaintordefectinatitletoproperty'
While the decision they penned rested on carefully crafted legalese, it is nonetheless accepted that other, more pragmatic, considerations undoubtedly influenced the judges' decision. Reid writes:
"Policy issues, as might be expected, were highly prominent in Lord Strichen’s Report. Trade, it was argued for the Banks, rested on the free circulation of money, and free circulation rested in turn on the reliability of notes and coins. If Crawfurd was able to vindicate the banknote, no merchant could risk taking money in payment ‘without being informed of the whole History of it from the Time that it first issued out of the Bank or the Mint till it came to his Hand, which is so apparently absurd, that it seems hardly to merit a Consideration’. And as banknotes would thus be rendered ‘absolutely useless’, this would ‘in a great Measure deprive the Nation of the Benefit of the Banks, which could hardly subsist without the Circulation of their Notes’. It was in vain for Home to object that, just as people continue to buy goods despite the (slight) risk that they might be stolen and subject to vindication, so they would continue to accept money if the risks were the same. If money could be vindicated, counsel for the Bank of Scotland concluded, ‘no Man could be sure, that one Shilling in his pocket was his own, and both Banks might shut their doors’." (emphasis mine)
Of course there were probably many other factors at play here. Although Crawfurd was of some means, it's likely that the bank was able to afford the very best representation in this case. Moreover, in Reid's research paper (linked below) he even points out that there was a fairly overt conflict of interest between the banks (the issuers of notes) and the judicial system at that time in Scotland. Reid also points out that there was some Roman jurisprudence (a source for many legal arguments in the case) that would seem to have roundly supported Crawfurd's case rather than that of the bank. Regardless of whether one ascribes impartiality to the judges in this case, or even whether or not one thinks the case was correctly decided based on previous jurisprudence, there's little question that the emerging paper currency system would have been greatly imperiled had the case been decided in favor of Crawfurd. Putting aside the obvious flaws inherent in paper banknotes, which were widely adopted in Scotland after their issuance first began in 1695, they did enable trade and commerce to occur on a previously unprecedented scale, and with less friction than seen with previous monetary systems (i.e. precious metals). In a society without telecommunications, Internet, and cryptocurrencies, the paper banknotes (although low-tech by modern standards) were nonetheless an innovation in the transfer of value within the country. We'll never know exactly what would have happened if the judges, by their decision, had abbreviated the fungibility of banknotes, or ‘the absolute currency of money’ as one Scottish legal scholar put it. But it seems likely that they would have thrown the monetary system into disarray, and interrupted a medium for commerce that many had come to rely upon for their wealth and prosperity. Perhaps this would even have been a major setback to the economic development of the country. Certainly this was one major concern that the judges had to take into consideration. At the time of the decision, some arguments in favor of the bank notably argued that tracking ‘the whole History’ of a given banknote would be so cumbersome to those transacting as to render the whole currency system useless. Ironically, the electronic and highly traceable nature of bitcoin does somewhat (though nowhere near entirely) mitigate this argument. But perhaps the more relevant question for today's world is whether it is wise to entrust the adjudication of a given monetary unit's history to some arbitrary entity. The deciders of whether or not a given unit has a 'clean' or 'tainted' history are given enormous power. Even the Scots arguing this case back in the 1700s recognized the danger this presented, in that it could lead to "opening a door for frauds by malicious and designing persons". Now we find ourselves at a similar crossroads as the Scots did... but instead of an intranational paper currency, there is potentially a decentralized, global value transfer protocol at stake. We must ask ourselves whether altering the monetary framework in order to punish lawbreakers and wrongdoers is something worth jeopardizing the very 'currency of money' for. Luckily, in making this choice, we are not wholly subjected to the caprices of some empaneled judges. Ultimately bitcoin is controlled by the people. Ultimately we can vote with our money, in line with our values. And while actively determining and participating in what may well be the future of money, I sincerely hope we all look to the lessons of the past for guidance. For further reading, here is my source for this post: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2260952
High fees and small blocks hurt privacy, core to Bitcoin's value.
In the debate of small-blockists (home users won't be able to run nodes! Chinese miners will get orphans!) vs big blockers (tx limit will scare away new adopters, businesses will fail!), I think privacy/anonymity is something that often gets overlooked. At first glance, privacy on Bitcoin appears to have little connection to the blocksize debate. If tx gets more expensive, it doesn't matter which tx, it'll all become more expensive, right? Small blocks make all tx more congested agnostically, right? Wrong. High fees and small blocks hurt anonymized tx a lot more than regular, trackable tx. Consider that Bitcoin transactions are not inherently anonymous: in fact, while people transact using pseudo-anonymous addresses, once anyone has a lead into your web of transactions - because your transactions are ultimately united by change outputs, and any time you link an address to your identity (say, when you buy from Coinbase or purchase through Bitpay, or register at Gemini), you increase the likelihood that you can be tracked. Publicly, on the blockchain. Luckily, we have ways to combat this. nullc himself first brought up the concept of Coinjoin: Before you use your coin, you "join" your output with someone else' output of identical value, yielding two outputs of indistinguishable ownership; the probability that you own any one of those outputs are cut by half. Rinse and repeat, voila, you become virtually untraceable. A working, market-incentivized implementation of Coinjoin, Joinmarket by belcher_, is under active development and already has a healthy community of users. Furthermore, also from nullc (and, in concept, adam3us) is "Confidential Transactions" (CT) to hide balance amounts. I won't pretend to understand the cryptographic details about it, but I was pretty impressed by how it works. But we have a problem here: All of these occupy more space on the blockchain. CT perhaps a little less so, but Coinjoin's hunger for additional txs grow as one attempts to outrun increasingly sophisticated tracking methods. Each tx is one additional time you pay a fee. Well, the amount of additional fee is trivial, no? For now. In a future of $1, $5 or $20 transaction fees - as those advocating a "fee market" seems to be fine with, because "blockspace is valuable" - it adds up really quickly. You want privacy, you want to anonymize, you should pay for it. Sure, but how much - and would I be able to outbid the non-anonymizing users (say, banks)? Another problem with this "you pay for your freedom" argument is: When the only people willing to pay for privacy are the one most desperate for it, even they get no privacy. All privacy system provides cover for censored activities by mixing them with regular activities; a system where the only activities present are censored simply does not work. Imagine if you release a "drugcoin" that has a public ledger, yet is used, and exclusively used for drugs. Does an authority need to know your tx detail to bust you? No, all they need to know is you touched drugcoin, at all. We need privacy features to be accessible and regularly used by almost all freedom-loving people, and a prohibitive fee structure is not gonna work. Okay I don't care about privacy and only decentralization, so this discussion is moot. Surely you care about the fungibility of Bitcoin? Because on a public ledger, privacy is essential to ensuring that your one coin will always remain spendable and equal to any other coin. All the decentralization and robustness won't help you if you can be arrested for spending from a specific address - and that's the end of Bitcoin's utility as a stateless, censorship-resistant money. I think we can come up with some scheme to make anonymity cheaper. I'm not an expert in cryptography, but even to me it seems like it's unlikely, under any scheme, that anonymized transactions will ever be as cheap as plain vanilla transactions. Mixing to lose your pursuers will always carry a cost if it is to happen publicly. The only way, as I see it, to mitigate this is to make all transactions cheap, so that anonymizing efforts are only trivially more expensive. But Lightning Network is gonna save us right? If you read how Lightning works, you'll realize soon that there's a huge privacy problem built right in there: Use too few Lightning hubs, and the hubs will know everything that goes through them. You know, just like banks. The hypothetical person who "settles" twice a year through a hub essentially has no privacy. You need to be able to cheaply settle and switch/maintain multiple hubs, on the chain, to maintain privacy. Also in that world, if your tx is driven all to LN because tx fee is too high, for reasons mentioned above it's unlikely that you'll be able to maintain your privacy on the blockchain. TL;DR Anonymity carries a cost that increases even more than regular tx when you have higher tx fees, and losing anonymity means losing Bitcoin's fundamental value. Anyone who cares about Bitcoin's value, or Bitcoin's role in letting people resist financial control from authorities, should be aware of this when talking about Blocksize.
Now that Lightning Network is live, can we revisit the fungibility of Bitcoin, or lack thereof, and discuss how the introduction of the Lightning Network may increase fungibility and ultimately reduce Monero's market share?
Several bitcoin-related projects under development will improve fungibility for this cryptocurrency. The Lightning Network will allow off-chain transactions, even though it is unclear when this ... However, do not worry, for bitcoin fungibility is inherently protected by design. If all else fails, there is always the ultimate solution to “fork off” the debilitating, validation-seeking ... Am Mittwoch ging es der Bitcoin-Community bei BIP 75 ins Schwindlige (BIP steht für Bitcoin Improvement Proposal), kurz gesagt, ein Layer-2-Protokoll zur Verbesserung der Benutzerfreundlichkeit von Bitcoin-Zahlungen. Die Community, insbesondere auf Reddit, ist besorgt, dass die Möglichkeit, sich gegenüber dem Absender oder Empfänger einer Zahlung zu identifizieren, So fungibility is something we’re fixing in Bitcoin because what it does is, it helps everybody, the innocent, the well-meaning, the people who pay taxes and want to educate their children and feed their children, and buy homes and cars and operate in society, protect their privacy from predators, from corporations, from tyrannical governments, from oppressive governments. So we need to do ... Bitcoin (BTC) Fungibilität: True or false? Laut Wikipedia wird Fungibilität wie folgt definiert: Fungibilität (lat. fungibilis „vertretbar“; auch: Vertretbarkeit) ist die Eigenschaft von Gütern nach Maßeinheit, Zahl oder Gewicht bestimmbar und deshalb innerhalb derselben Gattung durch andere Stücke gleicher Art, Menge und Güte austauschbar zu sein.
Fungibility - Comparing US Dollar vs Bitcoin vs Epic Cash
What is fungibility of money? Why do we need confidential transactions on bitcoin? Why is fungibility of Bitcoin so important? I explained in this video Simply. @SatoshiLite @bensemchee ... Bitcoin is somewhat fungible. What are the main concerns about fungibility and what can be done going forward? ----- Seminar: http://pro... Fungibility is simply that it doesn't matter where any given unit of currency came from; one unit is worth as much as any other unit. For example, it doesn't... This video is unavailable. Watch Queue Queue. Watch Queue Queue Crypto doesn't need to be cryptic... Join CoinMetro Founder and CEO, Kevin Murcko, as he breaks down seemingly complicated crypto terms into bitesize chunks,...